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Abstract
This paper analyzes behavior in repeatedly played two-stage games, where
players choose actions in both stages according to best replies using ’level-n
expectations’ about the opponent’s actions in both stages. Level-n expecta-
tions are recursively defined in a way that a player holding level n expectations
correctly predicts the action of an opponent holding level n− 1 expectations.
A general conceptual framework to study such dynamics for two-stage games
is developed and it is shown that, contrary to results for single-stage games,
the fixed points of the dynamics depend on the level of the expectations. In
particular, for level-zero expectation, fixed points correspond to a Nash equi-
librium of a simultaneous move version of the game, whereas (under certain
conditions) fixed points converge towards the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the two-stage game if the level of expectations goes to infinity. The approach
is illustrated using a two-stage duopoly game, where firms in the first stage
invest in activities reducing their marginal costs and in the second stage en-
gage in Cournot competition. An increase in the level of expectations leads in
the long run to higher cost reducing activities and higher output of the firms,
however to lower profits. Level-two expectations are sufficient to move the
fixed-point of the dynamics to a close neighbourhood of the subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
A large part of the theoretical and empirical analysis in many areas of economics
relies on the assumption that the behavior of the involved decision makers is deter-
mined by some sort of equilibrium. In contexts, like Industrial Organization, where
multi-stage games are frequently used to describe strategic interaction with sequen-
tial decisions, a standard equilibrium concept considered in the literature is that
of subgame perfect equilibrium as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. The notion
of (Nash) equilibrium rests on two basic assumptions. First, the assumption that
each player is able to determine his payoff-maximizing strategy given the strategies
of all other players and, second, that in equilibrium the expectations of each player
concerning the strategies of all players coincide with the strategies actually used by
these players. Both assumptions have been extensively discussed in the literature
and considerable amount of research has analyzed the question under which circum-
stances players, who ex-ante cannot determine their best responses and/or do not
have correct expectations about the strategies followed by the other players, can
over time coordinate in a way such that eventually a Nash equilibrium is played.
These studies assume that the considered game is played repeatedly and that players
adjust their strategies over time according to some given process.
The earliest stream of literature dealing with the dynamic stability of Nash equi-
libria is work on best response dynamics, where it is assumed that each player is
able to determine his best response correspondence, but ex-ante expectations about
the other players strategy are in general not correct and are updated over time
(see. e.g. Brown (1951)). A rich literature has studied the dynamic properties of
best response dynamics under naive and adaptive expectations in the framework
of oligopolistic market interaction (see the survey in Kopel (2009)) identifying con-
ditions on the market environment and the expectation formation process under
which Cournot, respectively Bertrand, equilibria are (locally asymptotically) stable
fixed points of the corresponding best response dynamics. This entire literature on
best response dynamics in oligopolies focuses, however, on one-stage games, which is
quite restrictive since many important issues in oligopolistic competition, like capac-
ity choice, location choice or cost reducing activities of firms, are typically analyzed
using multi-stage games.
The agenda of this paper is to relax this restriction to one-stage games and to
extend the analysis of best response dynamics to a scenario where in each period
firms interact in two sequential stages. Furthermore, we relax the assumptions of
naive expectations of individuals, which is typically made in this literature, to a class
of expectation formation functions denoted as ’level- n expectations, which include
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naive expectations as a special case.
In particular, we consider a standard two-stage model of duopolistic competition
with differentiated products introduced in Qiu (1997), where in the first stage firms
make cost-reducing investments and, in the second stage, they sell the product in the
market. We consider a scenario where the demand function and the cost structure of
both firms is common knowledge, but firms face strategic uncertainty in a sense that
they do not know their opponents actions in the current stage when making their
decision. Hence, they build expectations about these actions and then choose their
best response given these expectations. First stage actions are observable between
the stages, which means that expectations about the opponents second stage action
might be influenced by the first stage action of this player. Given our assumption
that the payoff functions of both players are common knowledge, both players are
in a position to determine not only the own best response function but also that of
the opponent in both stages.
Consider now a firm which expects that its competitor uses naive expectations
about its own actions. Anticipating that this competitor will play its best repsonse
based on these naive expectations the firm is able to correctly predict the action
of its competitor for any realization of the previous period actions (since the previ-
ous period actions are common knowledge). Denoting naive expectations as level-0
expectations, we will say that a firm following this kind of rationale has level-1
expectations. Such a firm would then choose its actions as a best response to its
level-1 expectations of the opponents action. Any firm who would correctly predict
the actions a firm with level-1 expectations is said to have level-2 expectations and
extending this reasoning we define level-n expectations for an arbitrary integer n.
The consideration of best response dynamics under expectations of this kind
in a two-stage setting raises several questions. First, and foremost, the issue of
equilibrium selection arises. Oligopoly games with multiple stages typically have
multiple Nash equilibria, among which there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
It is a standard result that the fixed points of iterated best reply dynamics (under
naive expectations) are Nash equilibria of the underlying game, but in the presence
of multiple equilibria it is quite unclear which of these equilibria are (stable) fixed
points of the dynamics. The question arises whether and how the set of fixed points
of the best reply dynamics under level-n expectations depends on the value of n. In
particular, we are interested in understanding under which circumstances firms may
in the long run coordinate on a subgame perfect equilibrium of the underlying two-
stage game. Second, extending the expectation formation process described above
from a one-stage to a two-stage game setting is not straightforward. We consider a
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two-stage game, where first stage actions are common knowledge in the second stage.
This implies not only that the expectation of a firm with respect to its opponents’
action in stage two should be updated after the revelation of the opponent’s action
in stage one, but also that the firm should have expectations about the effect of its
own first stage action on its opponent’s action in the second stage. The opponents
action in stage two is affected through two channels. First, the best response of the
opponent for a given expectation about the own stage 2 action might be influenced
by the own stage 1 action. Given our assumption that the firm knows the payoff
function and hence the second stage best response function of the opponent this
effect of the own stage 1 action is easy to predict. Second, the revelation of the
own first stage action might influence the opponents expectations about the own
action in stage two, which in turn affect the best response action of the opponent.
This channel of influence on the opponents stage-two choice depends on the way
the opponents expectation formation function. Hence, the best response function
of a firm on stage two depends on the way expectations are formed on stage two,
in particular it depends on the level of expectation formation on that stage. Such
a dependency of the best response function of a firm on the way expectations are
formed does not arise in the framework of one stage games and this induces that
the properties of the considered dynamics in two-stage games are stronger affected
by the level of expectation formation.
The paper puts forward three main findings. First, it is shown for a general
class of two-stage games, which includes the duopoly model with cost reducing
investments as well as many other standard models in industrial organization, that,
if the expectation formation follows the standard assumption of level-zero (i.e. naive)
expectations, then the fixed point of the best response dynamics corresponds to a
Nash equilibrium of a version of the game, where first stage actions are not revealed
before the second stage. Such equilibria are in general not subgame perfect. Put
differently, strategic effects of first stage actions on second stage outcomes have
no role under level zero exepctations. Second, it is shown again for the general
class of games that such strategic effects do play a role for the determination of
the fixed point of the dynamics if firm have expectations of higher level. As the
level of expectations tends to infinity the fixed points of the dynamics converge
to subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. In the framework of the duopoly with
cost reducing activities it is demonstrated that already for level-2 expectations the
unique fixed point of the dynamics is very close to the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. Third, if the level of expectation formation goes up in the duopoly with
cost reducing activities this induces an increase in the long run consumer surplus
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however a decrease in the long run profits of the firms.
These results are helpful for disentangling two implications of the revelation of
first-stage actions before the second stage. The first implication of the revelation,
which is that a firm can observe the opponent’s first stage action before choosing
the own second stage action, turns out to be irrelevant for the fixed point of the best
reply dynamics if expectations on stage 2 are naive. Although firms for any level
of expectations fully take the observed opponent’s first stage action into account
when determining their best reply, for expectation level smaller than two the fixed
point coincides with the one of the corresponding best reply dynamics, where the
first-stage actions are not revealed in the second stage Crucial for the location of
the fixed point of the dynamics is the second implication of the revelation of first
stage actions, namely that firms expect that their own first stage action influences the
opponents second stage choice via the opponents second stage expectation formation.
This effect becomes stronger the higher the level of the expectations and for large
expectation levels approaches the full fledged inter-stage strategic effect present in
the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we review the related
literature. In section 3 we introduce the concept of level-n expectation in a general
setting and derive in this framework characterizations of the steady states of the best
response dynamics under level-n expectations. Section 4 studies the implications of
an increase of the expectations level in a dynamic duopoly model, where firms can
invest in cost-reducing activities before competing on the market. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The paper is related to several streams of literature, which we briefly review here.
First, the question under which circumstances boundedly rational firms coordi-
nate on subgame perfect equilibria of extensive form games, has been discussed for
different types of evolutionary dynamics governing the strategy updating of play-
ers. Noeldecke and Samuelson (1993) consider a model, where for every player of an
extensive form game a population of individuals exists where every possible combina-
tion of individuals meets and plays. Individuals have beliefs about the frequency of
actions at all information sets and update them based on observable action profiles.
They determine their strategy as best responses to their beliefs in all information
sets, where with a small mutation probability the strategy is chosen randomly from
a given distribution. For extensive form games with perfect information, where
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every player moves at most once, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome has pos-
itive weight in the limiting distribution of the resulting Markov chain for mutation
probabilities going to zero. However, in general also Nash equilibrium outcomes
which are not subgame perfect can have positive weight in the limiting distribution,
which means that evolution generally speaking does not ‘select’ the subgame perfect
equilibrium. Intuitively, this result is due to a potential drift of individuals’ beliefs
about action profiles in information sets that are not reached in the subgame perfect
equilibrium. As has been shown in subsequent papers by Hart (2002) and Kuzmics
(2004), a unique selection of subgame perfect equilibrium in a certain sense can be
achieved if it is assumed that the population size tends to infinity as mutation prob-
abilities become small. Although these papers also deal with best response dynamics
of certain type, the considered setup is quite different from ours. Differently from
our setup, a population of individuals is considered for each player, where individu-
als base their beliefs completely on observed action profiles rather than taking into
account best response correspondences of the other players, as they do in our setup.
This property together with the presence of stochastic mutations are the key factors
allowing for the drift of beliefs in off-equilibrium information sets. Under the level-n
expectation dynamics considered here, players rely on best response considerations
when building their beliefs and therefore also for information sets, which have not
been reached in previous periods beliefs about opponents actions cannot drift. The
qualitative insights that subgame perfect equilibria of perfect information games are
stable with respect to evolutionary dynamics, but in general not the unique stable
outcome, has also been derived in the framework of different classes of deterministic
selection dynamics in Cressman and Schlag (1998) and Demichelis and Ritzberger
(2003).
The second related stream of literature deals with best response dynamics in
oligopolies. Such dynamics have been studied extensively under the assumption of
naive expectations (e.g. Theocharis (1960), Puu (1998), Tramontana et al. (2009))
and adaptive expectations (e.g. Okuguchi (1970), Bischi and Kopel (2001)), for
different assumptions about demand and production structure. Fixed points in these
one-stage settings always correspond to Cournot respecitvely Bertrand equilibria and
the focus of analysis has been on the stability of these fixed points, on the shape of
the basins of attractions in the case of several (locally) stable equilibria and on the
occurence of complex dynamics in such settings (see e.g. Bischi et al. (2010)). Our
results contribute directly to this literature by characterizing properties of the fixed
points of best response dynamics under naive expectations (level-zero expectations
in our notation) for two-stage games. More generally, our results show that the
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overall insight from this literature that any Nash equilibrium of the game is a fixed
point of best response dynamics under ’reasonable’ expectation formation rules (e.g.
naive or adaptive expectations) does not extend to multi-stage games.
The third stream of literature, which is relevant for this paper, deals with the
incentive for cost reducing activities of firms in oligopolistic markets. This litera-
ture is based on the insight that cost advantages relative to competitors improve
the position of a firms in oligopolistic competition. At least in cases of quantity
competition, common knowledge of marginal cost advantages of a firm makes its
competitor act less aggressively, thereby adding positive strategic effects to the pos-
itive direct effect of cost reduction on profits. Therefore, the firms (strategic) choice
of cost reducing activities is an important factor in oligopolistic competition. Qiu
(1997) has analyzed cost reducing activities (CRA) of oligopolistic firms in a two-
stage game setting, where firms first choose the intensity of cost reducing activities
and, after the effects of these activities on costs have become common knowledge,
in the second stage compete on the market. Based on the analysis of the (unique)
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game it is shown that cost reducing activities
are stronger under quantity than under price competition. In several papers using
similar two-stage games the effect of cooperation between the firms on the first or on
both stages of competition have been considered (e.g. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988)). Whereas much of this literature is based on the consideration of static two-
stage games, a few contributions have explicitly considered the fact that in most
oligopolies firms repeatedly interact on the market and can also repeatedly engage
in cost reducing activities. Cellini and Lambertini (2009), Cellini and Lambertini
(2011) and Breton et al. (2004) consider dynamic oligopolies, where firms, which at
each point in time compete on an oligopolistic market, can over time reduce their
marginal costs by investing in R&D. Since it is assumed here that R&D investments
imply persistent cost reduction, this dynamic strategic interaction is analyzed using
differential game models. Contrary to these contributions the focus in this paper
is set on cost reducing activities without persistent effects. In order to keep pro-
duction costs at a certain level firms have to keep also the level of cost reducing
activities. Examples for such activities are numerous and include production plan-
ning activities, monitoring or quality control activities. Furthermore, contrary to all
the contributions discussed above, this paper is based on the assumptions that the
cost reducing activities and quantity choices of the firms in the oligopoly ex-ante
do not follow any equilibrium of the game, which makes expectation formation an
important issue. Best response dynamics under non-rational expectations has been
hardly analyzed in the context of R&D choice in oligopolies. A rare exception is
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Bischi and Lamantia (2004) where a dynamic model of R&D choices is studied under
the assumption of naive expectations. However, in their setting competition on the
market is represented in reduced form, such that the game repeatedly played by the
firms has one-stage structure.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the level-n expectation formation considered
in this paper is related to the literature on level-k reasoning initiated in Stahl and
Wilson (1995) in the sense that like in this literature we assume that decision makers
choose best responses to expectations about the actions of the other players that
are recursively built in a way that expectations of order n are determined based on
best responses to expectations of order n− 1. However, the focus of our analysis is
quite different to that of the level-k literature. First, we deal with a dynamic model,
where decision makers adapt their expectations and actions over time. Whereas the
level-k literature is mainly interested in explaining behavior of individuals facing
novel situations, we mainly examine the long run behavior emerging if the same
type of interaction occurs many times. Second, contrary to the level-k models, there
is no hierarchy of beliefs in the best response dynamics with level-n expectations.
Rather, all players in the game share the same level of reasoning. Third, to our
knowledge the level-k literature has considered only one-shot games, whereas our
focus is on two-stage games.
3 Level-n Expectations and Best Response Dy-
namics
In this section we define level-n expectation and the corresponding best response
dynamics for a general class of two-stage games and characterize the steady states
of the dynamics for the two extreme cases of n = 0 and n → ∞. The games we
consider have a (not necessarily unique) interior subgame perfect equilibrium in pure
strategies and a unique pure strategy Nash equilibria in each of the subgames on
stage two. A large set of standard models in many areas of economics including
industrial organization fall into this class of games.
3.1 A Class of Two-Stage Games
Consider a two-player two-stage game, where at stage one both players simultane-
ously choose actions xi ∈ Xi with Xi compact subsets of IRm1i , m1i ≥ 1, i = 1, 2.
Between the two stages, choices made in stage one become common knowledge and
at stage two both players simultaneously choose actions qi ∈ Qi with Qi compact
8
subsets of IRm
2
i , m2i ≥ 1, i = 1, 2. At the end of stage two each player receives
a payoff pii(x1, x2, q1, q2) ∈ IR, i = 1, 2. We assume that both payoff functions are
everywhere twice continuously differentiable and that pii is strictly concave with re-
spect to qi for all (qj, x1, x2) ∈ Qj ×X1 ×X2. Hence, there exist single valued and
continuous best response functions on stage two of the form Rqi : Qj×X1×X2 7→ Qi.
Furthermore, we assume that for each pair (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 the mapping q 7→
Rq1(R
q
2(q1, x1, x2), x1, x2) has a unique fixed point q ∈ Q1, which means that for each
subgame defined by (x1, x2) there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A
sufficient condition for this property to hold is that the mapping mentioned above
is a contraction and in what follows we will make this assumption.1 We define as
q∗i : X1 × X2 7→ Qi the choice of player i in the unique Nash equilibrium of the
subgame defined by (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2. It follows from the assumptions above that
also this mapping is continuous and continuously differentiable for all (x1, x2) where
q∗i (x1, x2) ∈ int(Qi).
Considering the first-stage choices, we define
pi∗i (x1, x2) = pii(x1, x2, q
∗
1(x1, x2), q
∗
2(x1, x2))
as the payoff of player i induced by a pair of first-stage choices, under the assumption
that in all subgames on stage 2 the unique Nash equilibrium is played. We assume
that pi∗i is strictly concave with respect to xi for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2. A sufficient
condition for, often used in applications, is that the concavity of pii with respect to
xi is sufficiently strong to dominate the effect through q
∗
i and q
∗
j . The best response
correspondences on stage one are denoted by Rx∗i = arg maxxi∈Xi pi
∗
i (x1, x2) and we
assume that the mapping x1 7→ Rx∗1 (Rx∗2 (x1)) has at least one fixed point in X1,
which means that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of
the game.
In what follows we will sometimes refer to a version of the two-stage game without
revelation of action choices between the stages. In this version of the game the
choices made in the first stage remain unknown to the players when they make their
decisions in the second stage. Hence, this game is equivalent to a game where the
two players choose xi and qi at the same time. A Nash equilibrium (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) of
1This assumption could be weakened, but it is made to avoid some technical issues in the proof
of the main proposition in the following section. In games where the second stage is characterized
by linear best response functions this property is necessary for the existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium on stage 2. Hence, in many standard models in different areas of economics a
corresponding assumption is made.
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this game is characterized by
xˆi = Rˆ
x
i (xˆj, qˆj) and qˆi = q
∗
i (xˆ1, xˆ2), i = 1, 2, (3.1)
where
Rˆxi (xj, qj) = arg max
xi∈Xi
pii(xi, xj, R
q
i (qj, xi, xj), qj) (3.2)
denotes the optimal choice in the first stage of player i, given that the opponent
chooses (xj, qj) and taking into account that the own optimal choice in stage two is
given by the best response function on stage two. We refer to such an equilibrium as
a Nash equilibrium without revelation of actions between stages. It should be noted
that such equilibria are also Nash equilibria of the two-stage game with revelation
of actions between stages, but in general they are not subgame perfect equilibria of
that game.
3.2 Best reply dynamics under level-n expectations
In what follows we consider the dynamic evolution of the behavior of two agents who
repeatedly interact by playing the two-stage game described in the previous subsec-
tion. They choose their actions at both stages according to their best response with
respect to their expectations about the opponent’s action. In building their expec-
tations about the opponent’s action the players take into account that the opponent
will act according to her best response correspondence applied to her expectations.
Based on this we introduce the notion of level-n expectations by denoting naive
expectations as level-zero expecations and then defining level-n expectations as the
actual action of an opponent who has level-n− 1 expectations. In the following two
subsections we formalize this simple idea for expectation formation in the second
and the first stage of the game.
3.2.1 Stage two
In case the expectations are formed at stage two, the actions in the first stage have
been revealed and are taken into account when building the expectations We define
the level-n expectation generating functions in stage two recursively in the following
way:
qˆ0j (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t) = qj,t (3.3)
qˆnj (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t) = R
q
j
(
qˆn−1i (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t);x1,t+1, x2,t+1
)
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
10
for all (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t) ∈ X1×X2×Q1×Q2. It should be noted that qˆnj does
not depend on qi,t when n is even and not on qj,t when n is odd. For example for
n = 2 the expectation is formed from the perspective of player i, who expects that
player j anticipates that qi,t+1 is chosen as the best response to the naive expectation
qj,t and then chooses a best response to that anticipation about qi,t+1. Hence, this
expecation depends only on qj,t, but not on qi,t. To keep notation consistent we
nevertheless write all expectations as functions of both stage two actions in the
previous period.
Actual expectations in the second stage of period t are then given by
q2,nej,t+1 = qˆ
n
j (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t).
Clearly, for level n = 0 players have naive expectations.
The two players choose their stage-two actions (q1,t+1, q2,t+1) as best responses
to these expectations. Hence, we have for a process of level-n
qi,t+1 = R
q
i
(
qˆnj (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t), x1,t+1, x2,t+1
)
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (3.4)
where qˆnj is given by (3.3). In order to determine the full dynamics of the system we
have to move now to stage one in order to determine how x1,t+1, x2,t+1 are chosen.
3.2.2 Stage one
Expectation formation as well as the structure of the decision problem of the players
in stage one differs in several respects from that in stage two. The main difference
comes from the observation that the choice of xi in stage one influences the expecta-
tions of the opponent in stage two. The exact form of this influence depends on the
level of the expectation process, which means that the shape of the best response
functions of the players in stage one changes as the level of expectations changes.
For a given (expected) value xj,t+1 of the action of player j in t + 1 the problem of
player i in stage one reads:
maxxi,t+1∈Xi pii
(
xi,t+1, xj,t+1, R
q
i (qˆ
n
j (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t), xi,t+1, xj,t+1),
qˆnj (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t)
)
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
(3.5)
The solution of this problem is referred to as the best response of player i on stage one
under level-n expectations and denoted by Rx,ni (xj,t+1; q1,t, q2,t). Strictly speaking n
refers here to the level of expectation in stage two, since the best response function is
independent from the way expectations are formed in stage one. In case the problem
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has several solutions an upper-hemi continuous selection is chosen. To understand
the strategic effects emerging from the expectation formation it is instructive to
consider the first order conditions of problem (3.5). It is given by2
∂pii
∂xi,t+1
+
∂pii
∂qj
∂qnej,t+1
∂xi,t+1
= 0 i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (3.6)
where we have used the envelope theorem to drop the partial derivative of pii with
respect to qi and have deleted the arguments in all functions for ease of notation. The
second term in the sum captures the strategic effect emerging from the expectation
formation on stage two and the sign and the size of this effect is driven by
∂qnej,t+1
∂xi,t+1
.
Having defined this best response function we can formulate expectations in stage
one analogously to that in stage two. Since, the best response function in stage one
depends on the level of expectations in stage two we have to recursively define the
expectation generating functions in stage one for a given expectations level in stage
two. In particular, we define the level-m expectation generating function in stage
one given that expectations are of level n in stage two as:
xˆ0,nj (x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t) = xj,t (3.7)
xˆm,nj (x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t) = R
x,n
j
(
xˆm−1,ni (x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t); q1,t, q2,t
)
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
for all (x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t) ∈ X1 × X2 × Q1 × Q2. To reduce notation we write xˆn,nj
as xˆnj . Similar to stage two expectations, xˆ
n
j is independent from xi,t for n even and
independent from xj,t for n odd. The level-n expectations at stage one of period
t+ 1 now read x1,nej,t+1 = xˆ
n
j (x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t).
The resulting dynamics of stage-one actions under level n expectations follow
directly as
xi,t+1 = R
x,n
i
(
xˆnj (x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t); q1,t, q2,t
)
. (3.8)
Together with the dynamics of stage-two actions (3.4) this defines a dynamical sys-
tem
(x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t+1, q2,t+1) = Φ
n ((x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t)) (3.9)
with the generating map Φn : X1 ×X2 ×Q1 ×Q2 7→ X1 ×X2 ×Q1 ×Q2.
In the next section we will apply this general approach in order to formulate
and analyze the expectations and the resulting dynamics of actions for different
2To keep things simple we assume here that qˆnj is differentiable at the considered point in the
state space, which according to our assumptions holds true for points in the interior of the state
space.
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expectation levels n in the framework of a Cournot duopoly, where firms can invest
in cost reducing activities before making their quantity choices. Before we turn to
this application we formulate two general results characterizing the fixed points of
the expectations dynamics for the extreme cases of the lowest level n = 0 and n
going to infinity.
In the case of n = 0, which corresponds to naive expectations, the fact that
actions are taken sequentially and first stage actions are common knowledge in the
second stage does not influence the long run outcomes of the dynamics (at least if
the dynamics converges to a fixed point). The following Proposition shows that any
fixed point of (3.9) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game without revelation
of action choices between the stages.
Proposition 3.1. Let (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) be a fixed point of (3.9) for n = 0. Then
(xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) is a Nash-equilibrium of the game without revelation of actions between
the stages.
It follows from standard results concerning best response dynamics with naive
expectations in the literature that in the context of one-stage games the fixed points
of these dynamics must be Nash equilibria of the game. Based on this, one impli-
cation of Proposition 3.1 is that under naive expectations the fixed points of the
best response dynamics stay the same no matter whether the xi and qi are cho-
sen simultaneusly or sequentially with full revelation of first-stage choices between
the stages. This does not imply that the fact that choices are made sequentially
is irrelevant for the shape of the trajectories of the dynamics. Actually, it is easy
to see that in general the trajectories of(3.9) for n = 0 differ from that of best re-
sponse dynamics under naive expectations for the game where both players choose
xi and qi in the same stage. The reason why the fixed points of the two dynamics
nevertheless coincide is that under naive expectations expectations in stage two are
completely unaffected by the choices in stage one (i.e. the second term in (A.11) is
zero), which means that the best response function on stage one exactly coincides
with the best response function for xi without revelation of choice between stages.
Hence, the fixed points of stage-one actions in the two scenarios coincide. Since the
best response functions on stage two (for given choices of (x1, x2)) also coincide the
fact that the fixed points of stage one actions are the same implies that also the
fixed points of stage-two actions have to coincide.
We now turn to the other extreme and analyze the fixed points of expectations
dynamics if the expectations level is very high. Formally, we consider the limit
n→∞. If the level of expectations is larger than zero, in general it is not ensured
that players have correct expectations about the actions of the other player on stage
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one in every fixed point of the dynamics. There might be fixed points (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2)
where players have expectations xˆ1,nei 6= xˆi with the property that xˆj is a best
response to xˆ1,nei and xˆ
1,ne
i results from the application of the expectation generating
function xˆni to (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2). Such a phenomenon for example occurs for expectation
level n = 1 if the game without revelation of actions between stages has two Nash
equilibria. Denoting the first-stage actions in the two equilibria by (x¯1, x¯2) and
(x¯1, x¯2) with x¯i 6= x¯i, i = 1, 2, it is easy to see that xˆ1 = x¯1, xˆ2 = x¯2 with the
associated expectations xˆ1,1e1 = x¯1, xˆ
1,1e
2 = x¯2 is a fixed point of the expectations
dynamics, but players do not have correct expectations and the fixed point does
in general not correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the game. For levels n > 1
even symmetric steady states of the dynamics with a symmetric underlying game
might not be characterized by correct expectations, but might correspond to cycles
of order n of the stage-one best response functions Rx,ni . In what follows we will
however concentrate our attention to fixed points of the expectations dynamics,
where expectations converge to the correct values. Formally we use the following
definition.
Definition 3.2. A fixed point (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) of the level-n expectations dynamics
exhibits correct expectations in stage one if xˆi = xˆ
n
i (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) for i = 1, 2.
A necessary condition to rule out any fixed points where players do not have
correct expectation is that the best response functions on stage one are contraction
mappings. Since we have assumed contraction properties for the best responses on
stage two it is always guaranteed that expectations with respect to the actions on
stage two are correct in a fixed point of the dynamics. Loosely speaking the following
Proposition shows that the fixed points of (3.9) with correct expectations on stage
one converge to subgame perfect equilibria of the game as the level of expectations
becomes large.
Proposition 3.3. Let (xˆn1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∞
n=0 be a sequence of fixed points of (3.9) with
correct expectations on stage one for increasing expectation levels n. Let (xˆ∗1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2)
be an interior accumulation point of that sequence. Then, (xˆ∗1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2) is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game.
Although our assumptions about the best responses on stage two guarantee a
unique Nash equilibrium on stage two for any choice made on stage one, our frame-
work allows for scenarios where the expectations dynamics has several fixed points
with correct expectations for a given level n. According to Proposition 3.3 any limit
point of sequences of such fixed points for n→∞ must be a subgame perfect equi-
librium. Following our general assumption that the expectation levels are equal in
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both stages Proposition 3.3 is formulated for the case where levels in both stages
tend to infinity. However, it should be noted that the Proposition also applies to all
dynamics where the expectation level in the first stage is held constant at some ar-
bitrary level, including naive expectations, and only the level of expectations about
stage-two actions becomes large.Proposition 3.3 says that at least for large n the
fixed point of the dynamics is close to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
It is important to realize that Proposition 3.3 highlights a crucial difference between
the properties of fixed points of expectations dynamics for one-stage and two-stage
games. For one-stage games the set of fixed points with correct expectations is com-
pletely independent of the levels of expectations and only the speed of convergence,
respectively the stability of the fixed points might depend on this parameter. For
two-stage games the set of fixed points in general changes as the level of expectations
is increased. This observation implies that the explicit consideration of the effects
of expectation levels larger than one becomes much more crucial in the context of
two-stage games. Whereas for one-stage games it can be loosely argued that higher
levels in the long run lead to the same outcomes as level n = 0 typically considered
in the literature, for two-stage games this is no longer true. Therefore, it is a natural
and relevant question to ask how ’more sophisticated’ expectation formation in the
sense of higher expectation levels influence the long run outcome of the dynamics.
We will address these issues in the context of a two-stage duopoly model in the next
section.
4 Application to a Dynamic Duopoly with Cost
Reducing Activities
We now use the general framework developed in the previous section to study the
dynamics of cost-reducing activities in a Cournot duopoly under different assump-
tions about expectation formation. In particular, we consider a dynamic version of
a two-stage game introduced in Qiu (1997), where where firms produce horizontally
differentiated goods in a Cournot Duopoly. In the first stage each firm undertakes
cost-reducing R&D efforts, and, in the second stage, the firms choose their quan-
tities and produce. As discussed in the introduction the issue of strategic choice
of cost-reducing activities in an oligopoly has attracted considerable attention in
the industrial organization literature, and was analyzed both from a static and a
dynamic perspective, where the cost reducing activities are typically interpreted as
process innovation. We consider here cost reducing activities (CRA) which are of a
non-cumulative character.
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The inverse demand function for the product offered by firm i is given by
pi = a− qi − γqj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
with γ ∈ (0, 1). Due to cost reducing activities the firms can lower their marginal
costs, given by
ci = c− xi, i = 1, 2, xi ∈ (0, c).
The CRA-expenditure function of firm i is quadratic and of the form
V (xi) =
vx2i
2
, i = 1, 2.
In terms of our general framework we have a game with strategy spaces Xi = [0, X¯],
Qi = [0, a] for some large X¯ and payoff functions
pii(x1, x2, q1, q2) = (a− qi − γqj − c+ xi)qi − V (xi), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
4.1 Equilibrium Outcomes
We first derive the subgame perfect equilibria of the game using backward induction.
The chosen values of xi are revealed at the end of the first stage and become common
knowledge. Given any first stage CRA x1, x2 the firms maximize the profit on the
second stage with respect to the output. The first order condition ∂pii
∂qi
= 0 gives rise
to the best response function
Rqi (qj;x1, x2) = Max
[
0,
1
2
(a− c+ xi − γqj)
]
. (4.1)
and the intersection of the two best response functions determines a unique Cournot-
Nash equilibrium, which in the case of positive equilibirum quantities is given by
q∗i (x1, x2) =
(a− c)(2− γ) + 2xi − γxj
4− γ2 , i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Note that
∂q∗i
∂xi
= 2
4−γ2 > 0 and
∂q∗j
∂xi
= − γ
4−γ2 < 0, i.e. the first-stage CRA influ-
ences positively (negatively) the own (competitor’s) output decision on the second
stage and hence has an intertemporal strategic effect under the assumption that
the Cournot equilibrium is realized in the second stage. However, the best response
function of firm i only depends on xi, which means that for a given quantity of firm
j the best response of firm i is independent from the first stage choice of the level
of CRA by firm j.
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Assuming that the induced quantities in the second stage are positive, in the
first stage the firms maximize
pi∗i (xi) = pii(x1, x2, q
∗
1(x1, x2), q
∗
2(x1, x2)) =
(
(a− c)(2− γ) + 2xi − γxj
4− γ2
)2
− v
2
x2i ,
i = 1, 2, i 6= j with respect to xi. From the first order condition, (given in (A.2))
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that
v >
 4ac(4−γ2)(2+γ) for ac > 21 for 1 < a
c
< 2.
(4.2)
Then, there exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium with
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
SP :=
4(a− c)
v(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 4 ∈ (0, c) (4.3)
and
q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
∗
SP :=
(a− c)(2− γ) + 2x∗i − γx∗j
4− γ2 =
v(a− c)(4− γ2)
v(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 4 > 0. (4.4)
The resulting equilibrium profit is given by
pi∗SP = (q
∗
SP )
2 − v
2
(x∗SP )
2 =
v(a− c)2(v(γ2 − 4)2 − 8)(
4 + v(γ − 2)(2 + γ)2)2 .
The condition (4.2) guarantees that pi∗(x1, x2) is strictly concave with respect to
xi on Xi.
In addition to this subgame perfect equilibrium the two-stage game has many
Nash equilibria which are not subgame perfect. In general the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes includes all action profiles (x1, x2, q1, q2) with 0 < xi < c and q
∗
i = qi(xi, xj)
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. In particular we obtain:
Proposition 4.2. Define x¯ = min
[
(a−c)
(2+γ)
√
v
2
−1 , c
]
and consider an arbitrary x˜ ∈
[0, x¯]. Then, there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium (xNE, xNE, qNE(·), qNE(·))
of the game, such that xNE = x˜.
The level of CRA’s denoted by x¯ is the maximal level where firms have non-
negative marginal costs and non-negative profits in the corresponding Nash equi-
librium. This Proposition shows that a large range of outcomes can be interpreted
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as a Nash equilibrium of the two stage game. In particular, under condition (4.2)
any level of CRA below that in the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium is consis-
tent with Nash equilibrium. If we consider a version of this game, where first stage
actions are not revealed between the two stages, then the set of Nash equilibria
collapses to a single point.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that (x1, x2) is not revealed after the first stage and that
v > a
(2+γ)c
and a > c holds. Then, there exists a unique positive Nash equilibrium
(x̂1, x̂2, q̂1, q̂2) with
x̂1 = x̂1 = x̂NE :=
a− c
v(2 + γ)− 1 ∈ (0, x
∗
SP ) and
q̂1 = q̂2 = q̂NE :=
v(a− c)
v(2 + γ)− 1 ∈ (0, q
∗
SP ).
(4.5)
The profits of the two firms in that equilibrium is given by
piNE =
v(2v − 1)(a− c)2
2(v(2 + γ)− 1)2 .
Comparing the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game with
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game without revelation of stage-one choices,
we realize that the revelation of stage 1 actions leads to an increase of the level of
cost reducing activities and of quantities in equilibrium. Therefore, revelation of
actions between the stages leads to lower prices, which implies a higher consumer
surplus. On the other hand it can be verified that for all γ ∈ [0, 1], 0 < c < a and all
values of v satisfying (4.2) the profit of the firms in the Nash equilibrium without
revelation of stage 1 actions is larger compared to their profit in the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the two-stage game. The economic intuition for these observations is
that without revelation of the CRA before the quantity choice of the opponent the
additional incentives for CRAs stemming from the negative effect a reduction of own
costs on the opponents output disappears. Hence, firms invest less in CRA’s in the
game without revelation, which implies that marginal production costs are higher
and quantities are lower. With respect to the firms’ profits the positive effect of the
increase of the opponents costs outweighs the own reduction in CRA and therefore
the profit is larger without revelation of stage 1 actions. The comparison of these
two equilibria will turn out to be relevant for the understanding of the economic
implications of an increase of the expectations level for the long run outcomes of the
dynamics. We now turn to the analysis of these dynamics.
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4.2 Level-n expectations dynamics
We assume now that firms repeatedly interact according to the two-stage game
described above (with revelation of stage-one actions between the stages). Ex-ante
they are not coordinated in one of the equilibria and they have to build expectations
about the actions of the other firm in both stages. They build their expectations
according to the expectations process with level n, as described in section 2, and
choose their actions as a best response to these expectations.
Like in the discussion of the general case, we start the analysis of the expectation
dynamics by considering stage two. In that stage each firm has observed the level
of cost reducing activities by the opponent and builds expectations according to
(3.3). The following Lemma provides an explicit representation of the expectation
generating function for level-n expectations.
Lemma 4.4. The level n expectation generating function on stage two concerning
the quantity qj,t+1 is given by
qˆnj (x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t) =
(
1
2
(a− c+ xj,t+1)
) b(n−1)/2c∑
k=0
(
−γ
2
)2k
(4.6)
+
(
1
2
(a− c+ xi,t+1)
) bn/2c∑
k=1
(
−γ
2
)2k−1
+
(
−γ
2
)n
q·,t,
where buc denotes the largest integer smaller or equal than u ∈ IR and q·,t stands for
qi,t if n is odd and for qj,t if n is even.
Considering the effect of the choice of cost reducing activities by firm i in the
first stage of t+ 1 on the expected quantity of firm j, it can be seen that an increase
of the expectations level from n to n + 1 induces an increase of the coefficient of
xi,t+1 in qˆj only if n is odd. Put differently, if n is even, then increasing the level
by one does not change the size of the (negative) marginal effect of an increase of
xi,t+1 on the expected quantity of firm j and therefore also the strategic incentive to
invest stemming from the possibility to influence qj,t+1 with xi,t+1 should not change.
Based on the explicit representation of the expectations in stage two the following
Lemma gives the best response function in stage one under level-n expectations.
Lemma 4.5. The best response function in stage one under level-n expectations in
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stage two for sufficiently large values of (a− c) and v > 9
8
is given by
Rx,ni (xj,t+1, q1,t, q2,t) (4.7)
= max
0, 1 +∑bn/2ck=1 (−γ2)2k
2v −
(
1 +
∑bn/2c
k=1
(−γ
2
)2k)2
(
(a− c)
n∑
k=0
(
−γ
2
)k
−γ
(
−γ
2
)n
q·,t +xj,t+1
b(n−1)/2c∑
k=0
(
−γ
2
)2k+1 ,
where q·,t stands for qi,t if n is odd and for qj,t if n is even.
It should be noted that the coefficient of the CRA of the opponent is negative,
which means that, like in the static model, CRA’s are strategic substitutes. Also it
is easy to see that the absolute value of the coefficient of xj,t+1 is smaller than 1,
which means that the best response function on stage one is a contraction mapping.
The expectations concerning the actions on stage one, x1,nej,t+1 are built recursively
according to (3.7) where the best response Rx,nj is given by (4.7). Since the resulting
expression becomes rather large, we abstain from presenting the full expressions
of these expectation functions here. It is easy to see that also these expectation
functions are linear with respect to all arguments x1,t, x2,t, q1,t, q2,t. Using these
specifications of the best response and expectation functions, the dynamics is given
by (3.4) and (3.8).
Also for the fixed points of the expectations dynamics in principle a closed form
expressions could be given. However, the complexity of these expressions would
not allow substantial qualitative insights. Therefore, rather than providing these
expressions we characterize in the following propositions several key properties of
the sequence of the symmetric fixed points of the dynamics.
Proposition 4.6. Assume that v > 9
8
. Then there exists a unique symmetric in-
terior fixed point (xˆn, xˆn, qˆn, qˆn) of the level-n expectations dynamics. In the fixed
point firms have correct expectations at stage one and the following properties hold:
(i) xˆ0 = xˆNE, qˆ
0 = qˆNE
(ii) xˆn = xˆn+1, qˆn = qˆn+1 for n even.
(iii) xˆn < xˆn+1, qˆn < qˆn+1 for n odd.
(iv) limn→∞ xˆn = x∗SP , limn→∞ qˆ
n = q∗SP .
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Whereas items (i) and (iv) of the Proposition are just special cases of the general
results given in Propositions 3.1 and 3.3, items (ii) and (iii) provide additional
insights into the dependence of the fixed points on the level of expectations. In
particular, the proposition shows that the level of CRA’s and output in the fixed
point increases monotonously as the level of expectations grows. However, if the
considered level is even, then an increase by one does not alter the fixed point, so
the increase happens ’stepwise’ only at transitions from an odd to the next higher
even level. As pointed out above, this is due to the fact that the best response on
stage two is not directly influenced by the stage-one action of the other firm and
therefore the size of the strategic effect of the stage one choice on the opponent’s
action on stage two changes only at every second increase of n. The observation
that there are no fixed points of the dynamics where firms do not have correct
expectations is due to the fact that the best response function on stage one is a
contraction. This rules out multiple fixed points of the best response functions and
best response cycles, which would be needed for fixed points where expectations are
not correct.
Standard arguments imply that the characterized fixed points of the dynamics
are asymptotically stable as long as γ is sufficiently small. Precise conditions on this
parameter guaranteeing stability are however rather involved and since the focus of
the analysis is on the effect of the expectation level n on the location of the fixed
points we do not derive these conditions here. At the end of this section we will
however briefly get back to the issue of stability of the fixed point.
From an economic perspective Proposition 4.6 shows that if firms increase the
sophistication of their expectation rules, in the sense that they increase their expec-
tation level, this leads in the long run to more cost reducing activities and higher
outputs. As the expectation level n goes up the fixed points move monotonously
step-by-step from the Nash equilibrium of the game without revelation of cost reduc-
ing activities before the quantity choice towards the subgame perferct equilibrium
of the two-stage game.
The effect of an increase in the expectation level is illustrated in Figure 4.1, where
the size of CRA’s and output quantities in the unique fixed point of the dynamics
are depicted for different values of n3 It can be clearly seen that for n = 0 and n = 1
the fixed point coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the game without revelation
of actions between stages. However, already for n = 2 firms reach in the long-run
an outcome close to the subgame perfect equilibrium. As predicted in Proposition
3The parameter values used in all the figures are a = 5, c = 2, γ = 0.5, v = 1.2. Hence the
conditions on v of all Propositions in this section are satisfied.
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Figure 4.1: Level of cost reducing activities (a), output quantities (b) and firm profits
(c) in the unique symmetric fixed point of the expectations dynamics for increasing
n.
4.6 the long run outcome does not change if the expectation level is increased from
n = 2 to n = 3. Moving to n = 4 implies another small upward jump of long run
CRA’s and output of the firms. For this level the fixed point almost coincides with
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Therefore, further increases in the
expectation level do not lead to any observable changes in the fixed point. Panel
(c) of Figure 4.1 shows that this upwards movement of the fixed point values of
CRA’s and output associated with an increase in n leads to a reduction in firms’
profits. As discussed above, this is due to the fact that the negative price effect of
the decrease of the opponent’s marginal costs outweigh the positive profit effects of
the increase in own CRA’s. Increasing the level of sophistication in the expectation
formation process of the firms in the industry therefore has negative implications
for the average industry profits. Consumers however profit from such an increase in
sophistication, since the market price goes downs as n is increased.
The actual expectations dynamics for different expectation levels are illustrated
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Figure 4.2: Dynamics of cost reducing activities (a) and output quantities (b) under
different expectation levels: n = 0 (black), 1 (red), 2 (dark blue), 3 (light blue), 4
(green) and 10 (pink).
in Figure 4.2. The figure shows that although the fixed points for n = 0 and n = 1
coincide the transient dynamics differ. In particular, under naive expectations some
oscillations occur prior to convergence to the steady state, which are absent under
expectations of level n = 1. Starting with n = 2 the dynamics look very similar,
exhibiting very fast convergence to the steady state, which is close to the subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game. Actually, due to the larger range of x and q values
depicted in this figure compared to Figure 4.1 the difference in long run values
between n = 2 and larger levels is almost indiscernible. Overall, Figures 4.1 and 4.2
show that, whereas it is almost irrelevant whether naive expectations or expectations
of level n = 1 are considered, the transition to level n = 2 leads to a significant
qualitative change in transient and long run behavior. For such an expectation level
firms reach after a few periods a state very close to the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game.
Although the focus of this paper is on the characterization of the fixed points
of the expectation dynamics, we conclude the discussion by reconsidering the issue
of stability of the fixed points. Figure 4.2 shows that for our default parameter
setting, which includes a degree of horizontal product differentiation of γ = 0.5 the
fixed points of the dynamics are stable regardless of the expectation level. It is easy
to see that decreasing the degree of vertical differentiation makes the best response
functions on both stages steeper and therefore should contribute to a destabilization
of the fixed point (see also Hadar (1966)). Based on this reasoning we show in Figure
4.3 the expectations dynamics for different expectation levels for the case γ = 0.95,
which means that the products of the two producers are close substitutes. It should
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Figure 4.3: Dynamics of cost reducing activities (a) and output quantities (b) under
level-n expectations for γ = .95: n = 0 (black), 1 (red), 2 (dark blue), 3 (light blue),
4 (green) and 10 (pink).
be noted that all conditions used in the Propositions of this section, in particular
also the condition for the existence of an interior subgame perfect equilibrium are
still satisfied for this parameter value. The destabilizing effect of the increase in γ
can be clearly seen. For expectation levels 0, 2 and 4 both CRA’s and quantities
exhibit oscillations for several periods before they converge towards the steady state.
For n = 10 the fixed point now becomes unstable and CRA’s and quantities end
up in a period 2 cycle. This figure illustrates that more sophisticated expectation
formation in the sense of a higher level of expectations might prevent firms from
reaching a fixed point and coordinating in the long run. Whereas in the case of
naive expectations or expectations with low level firms in the long have correct
expectations, firms end up with persistently wrong expectations if their expectation
level is large. This at first sight counter-intuitive finding is due to the fact that
an increase in n makes the negatively sloped best response function on stage one
steeper (see (4.7)), which enlarges the danger of overshooting.
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5 Conclusion
This paper is a first contribution to systematically analyze the implications of differ-
ent levels of expectations formation for best response dynamics in multistage games.
Our analysis is focussed on a two-stage duopoly game where firms have sufficient
information about the production technology of the opponent such that they can de-
termine the best responses of the other firm on both stages. It is shown that in such
a setting the long run outcome on the market depends crucially on the level of rea-
soning underlying the expectation formation process of the firms. An increase in this
level does not lead to a smooth change of the trajectories. Rather, such an increase
has no or very little effect for most transitions but leads to a rather aprupt change
in the dynamics and long run outcome as the expectation level goes from n = 1
to n = 2. This means that whereas in the long run it does not make a difference
whether firms use naive expectations or anticipate that the opponent will choose
best responses to its naive expectations, there is a qualitative change in behavior
if firms take into account that the opponent might go through similar reasoning
than the firm itself and hold the expectation that about the firms own action that
correspond to its best response. In the context of the considered two-class duopoly
any more sophisticated reasoning than that does not lead a substantial change in
the behavior. Although the long run outcome of (stable) best response dynamics
depends on the level of expectation our results show that only outcomes between the
Nash equilibrium of the game without revelation of actions between stage and the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Comparing this with the range of all Nash
equilibrium outcomes shows that only a strict subset of Nash equilibria corresponds
to fixed points of the best response dynamics under level-n expectations. So, even
without information about the actual level of expectations this dynamic approach
provides some equilibrium selection.
In recent years substantial experimental work has been done to obtain a better
understanding of how individuals build expectations in different market settings (e.g.
Heemeijer et al. (2009), Hommes (2011)). The considered interaction structure in
these experiments typically has one-stage strcuture. The insight obtained in this
paper, that in two-stage problems market outcomes differ substantially depending
on whether decision makers build level-1 or level-2 expectations might be a basis for
experimental work on expectation formation in the framework of repeated two-stage
market interaction.
The analysis in this paper has mainly focussed in the location of (stable) fixed
points and has dealt with a linear-quadratic duopoly model with a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium. As has been documented in the literature considering nonlinear
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demand or cost specifications would certainly give rise to co-existence of locally
stable fixed points, or more generally attractors, and complex dynamical patterns. A
rigorous analysis how basins of attraction or dynamic patterns in standard two-stage
oligopoly games are affected by the level of expectation formation is an interesting
challenge for future work.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The fact that (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) is a fixed point of (3.9) and expectations are naive implies
using (3.4) and (3.8) that
qˆi = R
q
i (qˆj, xˆ1, xˆ2) , i = 1, 2 (A.1)
and
xˆi = R
x,0
i (xˆj; xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) , i = 1, 2
hold. From (A.1) we directly obtain that qˆi = q
∗
i (xˆ1, xˆ2) and (3.5) yields under
consideration of q0ej,t+1 = qj,t = qˆj that
Rx0i (xˆj; xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) = arg maxxi∈Xi pii (xi, xˆj, R
q
i (qˆj, xi, xˆj), qˆj) .
Using (3.2) this implies
xˆi = R
x0
i (xˆj; xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) = Rˆ
x
i (xˆj, qˆj).
Accoringly, (xˆ1, xˆ2, qˆ1, qˆ2) satsifies (3.1) and therefore is a Nash equilibrium of the
game without revelation of action choices between the stages. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
First, it should be noted that due to our assumption that pi∗i (x1, x2) is strictly convex
with respect to xi, the first order condition
∂pi∗i (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
=
∂pii(xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
+
∂pii(xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2)
∂qj
∂q∗j (xˆ1, xˆ2)
∂xi
= 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
(A.2)
in combination with
qˆ∗i = q
∗
i (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2), i = 1, 2 (A.3)
is a sufficient condition for an interior point (xˆ∗1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2) to be a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game. Since (xˆ∗1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2) is an interior accumulation point of
the sequence (xˆn1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∞
n=0 there must exist an interior subsequence (nk)
∞
k=0 with
limk→∞(xˆ
nk
1 , xˆ
nk
2 , qˆ
nk
1 , qˆ
nk
2 ) = (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2, qˆ
∗
1, qˆ
∗
2). To reduce notation we assume without
restriction of generality that the original sequence already has these properties.
To reduce notation we define qˆ2,nei = q
2,ne
i (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 ) for i = 1, 2. Because
(xˆn1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 ) is a fixed point of (3.9) with α = 0 we obtain from (3.4) that qˆi =
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Rqi (qˆ
2,ne
j ; xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 ), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Furthermore, assuming that n is odd, it follows
from (3.3) that
qˆ2,nej = R
q
j
 Rqi (Rqj (. . . Rqi (Rqj (qˆi; xˆn1 , xˆn2 ) ; xˆn1 , xˆn2) ; . . . ; xˆn1 , xˆn2) ; xˆn1 , xˆn2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)/2 times
; xˆn1 , xˆ
n
2

Together with qˆi = R
q
i (qˆ
2,ne
j ; xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
j ) this implies that qˆi is a fixed point of the n/2+1
times composition of the function Rqi (R
q
j(φ; xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 ); xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 ). Since this function is
assumed to be a contraction, also the n/2 + 1 times composition is a contraction
and therefore has a unique fixed point in Qi. Therefore, the fixed point of this
composition must coincide with the fixed point of Rqi (R
q
j(φ; xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 ); xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 ) and we
obtain that qˆni = q
∗
i (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 ), i = 1, 2. Analogous arguments establish that this
property also must hold if n is even. Since q∗i is continuous this implies that (A.3)
holds.
It remains to be shown that (A.2) holds true. Due to our assumption that players
have rational expectations on stage 1 in the considered fixed points we must have
xˆni = R
x,n
i (R
x,n
j (xˆi; qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 ); qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 ) = R
x,n
i (xˆ
n
j ; qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 ). Comparing the corresponding
first order condition
∂pii(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
+
∂pii(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂qj
∂qnej,t+1(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
= 0
with (A.2), it becomes clear that all which remains to be shown is that
lim
n→∞
∂qnej,t+1(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
=
∂q∗j (xˆ1, xˆ2)
∂xi
.
holds. Considering this partial derivative we first observe that
∂qnej,t+1(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
=
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂xi
,
where qˆn· stands for qˆ
n
i or qˆ
n
j depending on whether n is odd or even. The recursive
definition of qˆnj induces the following recursion for this partial derivative:
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂xi
= (A.4)
∂qˆn−1j (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂xi
+
∂qˆn−1j (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂q·
∂Rqi (qˆ
n
j ;xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
n even
∂qˆn−1j (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂xi
+
∂qˆn−1j (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂q·
∂Rqj (qˆ
n
i ;xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
n odd,
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where
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂q· follows the recursion
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂q·
=

∂qˆn−1j (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂q·
∂Rqj (qˆ
n
j ;xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 )
∂qi
n even
∂qˆn−1j (xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n
1 ,qˆ
n
2 ,qˆ
n· )
∂q·
∂Rqi (qˆ
n
j ;xˆ
n
1 ,xˆ
n
2 )
∂qj
n odd.
Furthermore, we have
∂qˆ0j (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂xi
= 0,
∂qˆ0j (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂q·
= 1.
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Direct calculation based on these expressions establishes
that the partial derivative with resepect to the last argument q· of the expectation
generating function at stage 2 is given by
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂q·
=

(
∂Rqi (qˆj ;xˆ1,xˆ2)
∂qj
)n/2 (∂Rqj (qˆi;xˆ1,xˆ2)
∂qi
)n/2
n even(
∂Rqi (qˆj ;xˆ1,xˆ2)
∂qj
)(n−1)/2 (∂Rqj (qˆi;xˆ1,xˆ2)
∂qi
)(n+1)/2
n odd
Inserting this into (A.4) finally yields
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂xi
= (A.5)
∂Rqi
∂xi
∑n/2
k=1
(
∂Rqi
∂qj
)k−1 (∂Rqj
∂qi
)k
+
∂Rqj
∂xi
∑n/2−1
k=0
(
∂Rqi
∂qj
)k (∂Rqj
∂qi
)k
n even
∂Rqi
∂xi
∑(n−1)/2
k=1
(
∂Rqi
∂qj
)k−1 (∂Rqj
∂qi
)k
+
∂Rqj
∂xi
∑(n−1)/2
k=0
(
∂Rqi
∂qj
)k (∂Rqj
∂qi
)k
n odd,
where we again have dropped all functional arguments on the right side to lighten
the notation. Due to our assumption that the composition of the two best response
functions on stage 2 is a contraction we have ‖ ∂Rqi
∂qj
∂Rqj
∂qi
‖∞< 1 and taking the limit
for n→∞ in (A.5) we obtain
lim
n→∞
∂q2,nej,t+1(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
= lim
n→∞
∂qˆnj (xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
· )
∂xi
=(
∂Rqi (q
∗
j ;x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂xi
)(
∂Rqj (q
∗
i ;x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂qj
)
+
∂Rqj (q
∗
i ;x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂xi
1−
(
∂Rqi (q
∗
j ;x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂qj
)(
∂Rqj (q
∗
i ;x
∗
1,x
∗
2)
∂qj
) .
To conclude the proof we have to compare this expression to
∂q∗j (xˆ
∗
1,xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
. Since q∗j gives
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the Nash equilibrium choice of player j on stage 2 it has to satisfy
q∗j (x1, x2) = R
q
j(R
q
i (q
∗
j (x1, x2);x1, x2);x1, x2)
for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2. Taking the derivative with respect to xi on both sides at
(x1, x2) = (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2) yields
∂q∗j (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
=
∂Rqj(qˆ
∗
i ; xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
+
∂Rqj(qˆ
∗
i ; xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂qi
(
∂Rqi (qˆ
∗
j ; xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
+
∂Rqi (qˆ
∗
j ; xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂qj
∂q∗j (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
)
,
where we have used that qˆ∗j = q
∗
j (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2) and qˆ
∗
i = R
q
i (qˆ
∗
j ; xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2). Collecting terms
gives
∂q∗j (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
=
∂Rqj (qˆ
∗
i ;xˆ
∗
1,xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
+
(
∂Rqj (qˆ
∗
i ;xˆ
∗
1,xˆ
∗
2)
∂qi
)(
∂Rqi (qˆ
∗
j ;xˆ
∗
1,xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
)
1−
(
∂Rqj (qˆ
∗
i ;xˆ
∗
1,xˆ
∗
2)
∂qi
)(
∂Rqi (qˆ
∗
j ;xˆ
∗
1,xˆ
∗
2)
∂qj
)
and we have shown that
lim
n→∞
∂q2,nej,t+1(xˆ
n
1 , xˆ
n
2 , qˆ
n
1 , qˆ
n
2 )
∂xi
=
∂q∗j (xˆ
∗
1, xˆ
∗
2)
∂xi
.
This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Direct calculations give the first order condition
∂pi∗i (x1, x2)
∂xi
=
2
4− γ2 (a− c+ x
∗
i − γq∗j )− vx∗i = 0 (A.6)
In order to guanrantee that the first order condition characterizes the maximum
of pi∗ we have to check that pi∗ is concave and that marginal costs and quantities
are positive at the point where the FOC is satisfied. The second order condition is
given by
v >
1
2
( 4
4− γ2
)2
, (A.7)
the condition x∗SP > 0 and q
∗
SP > 0 yields
v >
4
(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 (A.8)
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and the condition for c− x∗SP > 0 yields
v >
4a
c(2 + γ)(4− γ2) . (A.9)
The condition (A.7) implies (A.8) and therefore (A.7) and (A.9) are the binding
constraints. Equalizing the terms on the right hand side of these two inequalities
yields
1
2
( 4
4− γ2
)2
=
4a
c(2 + γ)(4− γ2)
which can be simplified to
γ =
2(a− c)
a
.
One observes the possible relation between a and c for the feasible boundary values
of γ, i.e. γ = 0 and γ = 1. Obviously, γ = 0 implies a = c and γ = 1 implies
a = 2c. Hence, for a ≥ 2c (A.9) is more restrictive than (A.7) regardless of γ.One
gets immediately
max
{
1
2
( 4
4− γ2
)2
,
4a
c(2 + γ)(4− γ2) :
a
c
> 2
}
=
4a
c(2 + γ)(4− γ2) .
and for 1 < a
c
< 2 the following holds
max
{
1
2
( 4
4− γ2
)2
,
4a
c(2 + γ)(4− γ2) : 1 <
a
c
< 2
}
=

4a
c(γ+2)(4−γ2) for 0 < γ 6
2(a−c)
a
1
2
(
4
4−γ2
)2
for 1 > γ > 2(a−c)
a
< 1.
This argumentation directly yields the following result
v >
 4ac(2+γ)(4−γ2) for ac > 21 for 1 < a
c
< 2.
Finally, it has to be guaranteed that profits of both firms are non-negative for levels
of CRA characterized by (A.6). From the expression for pi∗SP given in the Proposition
we obtain directly that profits are non-negative iff
v ≥ 8
(4− γ2)2
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and it is easy to see that this inequalitya always holds under condition (??). This es-
tablishes that the first order conditions (A.6) indeed characterize the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium and the claims of the Proposition now follow by straight-forward
calculations. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Define
qNE(x1, x2) :=
q∗i (x˜, x˜) if x1 = x2β else
for sufficiently high β. Because of x˜ ≤ x¯ we have pii(x˜, x˜, q∗1(x˜, x˜), q∗2(x˜, x˜)) ≥ 0.
Given firm i’s competitor’s decision qj = qNE and xj = x˜, we consider two scenarios
concerning the strategy of firm i with respect to the CRA. If xi 6= x˜ this implies for
the reaction of firm j that qˆj(xi, xj) = β which implies p ≤ 0 and therefore pii < 0.
Therefore, in its best response, firm i always chooses xi = x˜. This implies for the
best response of firm i with respect to the quantity that
qˆi (x˜, x˜) = R
q
i
(
x˜, q∗j (x˜, x˜)
)
= q∗i (x˜, x˜) (A.10)
must hold, where Rqi (x˜, qj) denotes the best reply function of firm i at the quantity
choice stage. The crucial equality in (A.10) follows because q∗i (x˜, x˜) is the Nash
equilibrium quantity in the second stage for (xi, xj) = (x˜, x˜). The quantity choice
of firm i at any level of CRA different from (x˜, x˜) does not affect its payoff and
therefore setting these quantities to β is (weakly) optimal for the firm. This shows
that (xNE, qNE(x1, x2) is indeed a best response for firm i. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.3:
In an interior Nash equilibrium we must have qˆi = R
q
i (qˆj; xˆ1, xˆ2) and the first order
condition with respect to xi,
qˆi − vxˆi = 0
must hold. It is easy to see that the combination of these two conditions yields under
the assumption of positive costs and quantities the unique solution given in (4.5).
The second order conditions are 2 > 0 and v > 0, the condition for x̂∗NE > 0, q̂
∗
NE > 0
is v > 1
2+γ
and the condition for x̂∗NE ∈ (0, c) can be rewritten to v > a(2+γ)c . It is
easy to check that under these conditions no equilibrium with zero output of one
firm can exist. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 4.4:
We show the Lemma by induction. For n = 0 we have
qˆ0(x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t, φ) = φ,
which corresponds to (4.6) for n = 0. Assume that (4.6) holds for some even n.
Then, we obtain for order n+ 1
qˆn+1(x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t, φ)
= qˆn
(
x1,t+1, x2,t+1, q1,t, q2,t, αqj + (1− α)Rqj(φ;x1,t+1, x2,t+1)
)
=
(
αqj +
1
2
(1− α)(a− c+ xj,t+1)
) b(n−2)/2c∑
k=0
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k
+
(
αqi +
1
2
(1− α)(a− c+ xi,t+1)
) bn/2c∑
k=1
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k−1
+
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)n(
αqj + (1− α)1
2
(a− c+ xi,t+1 − γφ)
)
=
(
αqj +
1
2
(1− α)(a− c+ xj,t+1)
) bn/2c∑
k=0
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k
+
(
αqi +
1
2
(1− α)(a− c+ xi,t+1)
) b(n+1)/2c∑
k=1
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k−1
+
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)n+1
φ.
Hence, (4.6) holds also for n + 1. The transition from an odd n to n + 1 can be
verified analogously, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4.5:
For given xj,t+1 the maximization problem of firm i in stage 1 reads
maxxi,t+1∈[0,X¯]
[
Rqi (q
2,ne
j,t+1;x1,t+1, x2,t+1)
(
a−Rqi (q2,nej,t+1(q1,t, q2,t, x1,t+1, x2,t+1);x1,t+1, x2t+ 1)
−γq2,nej,t+1 − (c− xi,t+1)
)− v
2
x2i,t+1
]
,
where it should be kept in mind that q2,nej,t+1 is a function of (q1,t, q2,t, x1,t+1, x2,t+1).
Taking into accout that Rqi has to satisfy the first order condition on stage 2, and
assuming that c − xi,t+1 > 0, and Rqi > 0, the first oder condition of this problem
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reads
Rqi (q
2,ne
j,t+1;x1,t+1, x2t+ 1)
(
−γ ∂q
2,ne
j,t+1
∂xi,t+1
+ 1
)
− vxi,t+1 = 0 (A.11)
Assuming that the second order condition holds, the first order condition character-
izes the optimal solution to this problem as long as the value of xi,t+1 satisfying the
FOC is positive. From Lemma 4.6 we obtain that
∂q2,nej,t+1
∂xi,t+1
=
bn/2c∑
k=1
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k−1
and inserting this as well as (4.1) into (A.11) and solving for xi,t+1 yields after some
tedious calculations the expression given in (4.7). Clearly, this expression is positive
for sufficiently large values of (a− c). The second order condition for a maximum is
given by
v >
1
2
1 + bn/2c∑
k=1
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k2 .
Taking into account that
(
−γ(1−α)
2
)
∈ [−0.5, 0.5] we get for the the right hand side
of this inequality
1
2
1 + bn/2c∑
k=1
(
−γ(1− α)
2
)2k2
=
1
2
1 + (−γ(1− α)
2
)2 1− (−γ(1−α)
2
)n
1−
(
−γ(1−α)
2
)2

2
<
1
2
(
1 +
(
1
2
)2 1 + 1
2
1− (1
2
)2
)2
=
9
8
. Since the objective function of firm i on stage 1 is quadratic in xi,t+1, the condition
v > 9
8
guarantees the concavity of the objective function on [0, X¯]. This completes
the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.6:
It follows directly from the arguments given in the proof of Proposition 3.3 that a
symmetric interior fixed point (xˆn, xˆn, qˆn, qˆn) of the adaptive expectation dynamics
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of order n has to satisfy
qˆn = Rq(qˆn; xˆn, xˆn) =
a− c+ xˆn − γqˆn
2
, (A.12)
which implies qˆn = a−c+xˆ
n
2+γ
. Due to the symmetry of the game we haveRx,n1 (x, qˆ
n, qˆn, qˆn) =
Rx,n2 (x, qˆ
n, qˆn, qˆn) and we denote this function as Rˆx,n(x). Analogously we write
xˆ1,ne(x) = x1,nei (x, x, qˆ
n, qˆn), i = 1, 2. Since Rˆx,n is a contraction also the mapping
αx+ (1−α)Rˆx,n(x) is a contraction for all positive α and, considering the recursion
(3.7) used to generate the expectations in stage 1 and the fact that Rˆx,n is linear in
x, we obtain |∂xˆ1,ne(x)
∂x
| ≤ 1 for all x ∈ (0, X¯). Furthermore, due to the fixed point
property, we must have
xˆn = Rˆx,n(xˆ1,ne(xˆn)) (A.13)
Taking into account that |Rˆ′| < 1 it becomes clear that the function on the the right
hand side of this equation is also a contraction, which means that it has a unique
fixed point in [0, X¯]. Due to the contraction property of Rˆx,n also the equation
x = Rˆx,n(x) has a unique fixed point in [0, X¯]. It is easy to see that this fixed point
is also a fixed point of (A.13). Therefore, the two fixed points must coincide, which
means that (xˆn, xˆn, qˆn, qˆn) has to satisfy xˆ
n = Rˆx,n(xˆn) and xˆ1,ne(xˆn) = xˆn. Due to
the fact that marginal costs of CRAs at xi = 0 are zero the fixed point can never be
at xˆn = 0. This shows that there exists a unique symmetric interior fixed point and
that at this fixed point both firms have correct expectations at both stages.
Concerning items (i) to (iv) in the proposition, the items (i) and (iv) are direct
implications of Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 and need no special proof. In order to show
points (ii) and (iii) we introduce the following simpliying notation:
F =
−(1− α)γ
2
, S1(n) =
b(n−1)/2c∑
k=0
F 2k, S2(n) =
bn/2c∑
k=1
F 2k−1, S3(n) =
n∑
k=0
F k.
From
xˆn = Rx,ni (xˆ
n, qˆn, qˆn, qˆn)
we obtain after insertion of qˆn = a−c+xˆ
n
2+γ
into (4.7) and collecting terms the equation
A(n)xˆn = B(n)(a− c)
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with
A(n) = 2v − 1− 2FS2(n)− F 2S2(n)2
+(1 + FS2(n))
(
αγ
2 + γ
(S3(n)− F n) + γ
2 + γ
F n − FS1(n)
)
B(n) = (1 + FS2(n))
(
S3(n)− αγ
2 + γ
(S3(n)− F n)− γ
2 + γ
F n
)
.
It can be easily verified that A(n) and B(n) are both positive under our assumptions,
which confirms that the equation has a unique positive solution. To prove points (ii)
and (iii) of the Proposition we have to characterize the signs of A(n+ 1)−A(n) and
B(n + 1) − B(n). To this end we denote ∆Sj(n) = Sj(n + 1) − Sj(n), j = 1, . . . , 3
and obtain
∆S1(n) =
{
F n n even
0 n odd
∆S2(n) =
{
0 n even
F n n odd
∆S3(n) = F
n+1
Considering first the case where n is even we have after collecting terms
A(n+ 1)− A(n) = (1 + FS2(n))F n
(
γ
2 + γ
(F − 1)− F + αγ
2 + γ
)
= 0
B(n+ 1)−B(n) = (1 + FS2(n))F n
(
F − αγ
2 + γ
− γ
2 + γ
(F − 1)
)
= 0,
where
(
F − αγ
2+γ
− γ
2+γ
(F − 1)
)
= 0 can be verified by inserting F = −(1−α)γ
2
.
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Clearly, this implies that xˆn+1 = xˆn. If n is odd the corresponding terms read
A(n+ 1)− A(n) = (1 + FS2(n))F n
(
−2F + αγ
2 + γ
+
γ
2 + γ
(F − 1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−F
+F n+1
(
−F n+1 + αγ
2 + γ
(S3(n)− F n) + γ
2 + γ
F n − FS1(n)
)
= F n+1
−1− F (S1(n) + S2(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=S3(n)−Fn
+
αγ
2 + γ
S3(n) +
(1− α)γ
2 + γ
F n − F n+1

= F n+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−1 + S3(n)( αγ2 + γ − F
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
(1− α)γ
2 + γ
F n︸︷︷︸
<0

< 0
and
B(n+ 1)−B(n) = (1 + FS2(n))F n
(
F − αγ
2 + γ
− γ
2 + γ
(F − 1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+F n+1
(
S3(n)− αγ
2 + γ
(S3(n)− F n)− γ
2 + γ
F n
)
= F n+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
S3(n)(1− αγ2 + γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−(1− α)γ
2 + γ
F n︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

> 0 .
This implies that xˆn+1 = B(n+1)
A(n+1)
> B(n)
A(n)
= xˆn and therefore also qˆn+1 > qˆn must
hold. Q.E.D.
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